Web security

Session Management and User Authentication on the Web
... but first, finishing up HTTPS
Problems with HTTPS and the Lock Icon

1. Upgrade from HTTP to HTTPS

2. Forged certs

3. Mixed content: HTTP and HTTPS on the same page

4. Does HTTPS hide web traffic?
   – Problems: traffic analysis, compression attacks
2. Certificates: wrong issuance

2011: **Comodo** and **DigiNotar** CAs hacked, issue certs for Gmail, Yahoo! Mail, ...

2013: **TurkTrust** issued cert. for gmail.com (discovered by pinning)

2014: **Indian NIC** (intermediate CA trusted by the root CA **IndiaCCA**) issue certs for Google and Yahoo! domains

   Result: (1) India CCA revoked NIC’s intermediate certificate

   (2) Chrome restricts India CCA root to only seven Indian domains

2016: **WoSign** (Chinese CA) issues cert for GitHub domain (among other issues)

   Result: WoSign certs no longer trusted by Chrome and Firefox

⇒ enables eavesdropping w/o a warning on user’s session
Man in the middle attack using rogue cert

GET \texttt{https://bank.com}

ClientHello

\textbf{ClientHello}

\textbf{BadguyCert}

\textbf{BankCert}

\textbf{ServerCert (\textit{rogue})}

\textbf{ServerCert (Bank)}

\textbf{(cert for Bank by a valid CA)}

\textbf{SSL key exchange}

\textbf{k}_1 \quad \textbf{k}_1

\textbf{HTTP data enc with } \textbf{k}_1

\textbf{SSL key exchange}

\textbf{k}_2 \quad \textbf{k}_2

\textbf{HTTP data enc with } \textbf{k}_2

Attacker proxies data between user and bank. Sees all traffic and can modify data at will.
What to do? (many good ideas)

1. **Public-key pinning (static pins)**
   - Hardcode list of allowed CAs for certain sites (Gmail, facebook, ...)
   - Browser rejects certs issued by a CA not on list
   - Now deprecated (because often incorrectly used in practice)

1. **Certificate Transparency (CT):** [LL’12]
   - Idea: CA’s must advertise all certs. they issued on a public log
   - Browser will only use a cert if it is published on (two) log servers
     - Server attaches a signed statement from log (SCT) to certificate
     - Companies can scan logs to look for invalid issuance
CT requirements

April 30, 2018:  CT required by chrome

• Required for all certificates with a path to a trusted root CA
  (not required for an installed root CA)

• Otherwise: HTTPS errors

Cert for crypto.stanford.edu published on five logs:
  cloudflare_nimbus2018
  google_argon2018, google_aviator
  google_pilot, google_rocketeer
4. Peeking through SSL: traffic analysis

- Network traffic reveals length of HTTPS packets
  - TLS supports up to 256 bytes of padding

- AJAX-rich pages have lots and lots of interactions with the server

- These interactions expose specific internal state of the page

BAM!

Chen, Wang, Wang, Zhang, 2010
Vulnerabilities in an online tax application

No easy fix. Can also be used to ID Tor traffic
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=aapl
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

Javascript can issue requests to Bank, but cannot read Cookie value
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=a
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

observe ciphertext size
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=b
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

observe ciphertext size
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=j
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

ciphertext slightly shorter
⇒ first character of Cookie is “j”
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=ja
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

observe ciphertext size
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=jh
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

ciphertext slightly shorter
⇒ 2nd character of Cookie is “h”
Even worse: the CRIME and BREACH attacks

Goal: steal user’s bank cookie

POST /bank.com/buy?id=uid=jh
Cookie: uid=jhPL8g69684rksfsdg

Recover entire cookie after
$256 \times |\text{Cookie}|$ tries

Takes several minutes (simplified)
What to do?

- Disable compression
- Use a different LZW dictionary for parts under Javascript control and parts that are not
- Change secret (Cookie) after every request

Does not solve info leakage due to compression
Interlude: Designing Security Prompts
Users are faced with a lot of challenging trust-related decisions
An example problem: IE6 mixed context

Vague threat. What’s the risk? What could happen?

“Yes”, the possibly less safe option, is the default

How should the user make this decision? No clear steps for user to follow.
Better

Even better: load the safe content, and use the address bar to enable the rest
Guidelines

• Philosophy:
  – Does the user have unique knowledge the system doesn’t?
  – Don’t involve user if you don’t have to
  – If you involve the user, enable them to make the right decision

• Make sure your security dialogs are NEAT:
  – **Necessary:** Can the system take action without the user?
    If the user has no unique knowledge, redesign system.
  – **Explained:** *see next slides*
  – **Actionable:** Can users make good decisions with your UI in both malicious and benign situations?
  – **Tested:** Test your dialog on a few people who haven’t used the system before -- both malicious and benign situations.
Example 1: bad explanation

IE6 CRL check failure notification

Most users will not understand “revocation information”.

Choices are unclear, consequence is unclear.
There is a problem with this website's security certificate.

The security certificate presented by this website was not issued by a trusted certificate authority.

Security certificate problems may indicate an attempt to fool you or intercept any data you send to the server.

We recommend that you close this webpage and do not continue to this website.

- Click here to close this webpage.
- Continue to this website (not recommended).

More information:
- If you arrived at this page by clicking a link, check the website address in the address bar to be sure that it is the address you were expecting.
- When going to a website with an address such as https://example.com, try adding the 'www' to the address, https://www.example.com.
- If you choose to ignore this error and continue, do not enter private information into the website.

For more information, see "Certificate Errors" in Internet Explorer Help.
Your connection is not private

Attackers might be trying to steal your information from expired.badssl.com (for example, passwords, messages, or credit cards). Learn more

NET::ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID

Help improve Safe Browsing by sending some system information and page content to Google.
Privacy policy
In Chrome (2019)

Process

This server could not prove that it is expired.badssl.com; its security certificate expired 1,483 days ago. This may be caused by a misconfiguration or an attacker intercepting your connection. Your computer's clock is currently set to Saturday, May 4, 2019. Does that look right? If not, you should correct your system's clock and then refresh this page.

Choice

(unsafe)
Example 2: bad explanation

Attacker can abuse explanation causing bad user decisions.

Used by Conficker spread through USB drives.
A better design

Windows 7 AutoPlay removed the auto-run option
Session Management and User Authentication on the Web

... back to Web security
Sessions

A sequence of requests and responses from one browser to one (or more) sites

– Session can be long (e.g. Gmail) or short
– without session mgmt:
  users would have to constantly re-authenticate

Session mgmt: authorize user once;
– All subsequent requests are tied to user
Pre-history: HTTP auth

HTTP request: GET /index.html

HTTP response contains:

WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="Password Required"

Browsers sends hashed password on all subsequent HTTP requests:

Authorization: Basic ZGFddfibzsdfgkjheczI1NXRleHQ=
HTTP auth problems

Hardly used in commercial sites:

• User cannot log out other than by closing browser
  – What if user has multiple accounts?
    multiple users on same machine?

• Site cannot customize password dialog

• Confusing dialog to users

• Easily spoofed

Do not use ...
Session tokens

Browser

GET /index.html
set anonymous session token

GET /books.html
anonymous session token

POST /do-login
Username, password, and 2\textsuperscript{nd} factor
elevate to a logged-in session token

POST /checkout
logged-in session token

web site

check credentials (crypto course)

Validate token
Storing session tokens:  
Lots of options  (but none are perfect)

Browser cookie:

```
Set-Cookie: SessionToken=fduhye63sfdb
```

Embed in all URL links:

```
https://site.com/checkout ? SessionToken=kh7y3b
```

In a hidden form field:

```
<input type="hidden" name="SessionToken" value="uydh735">
```
Storing session tokens: problems

Browser cookie: browser sends cookie with every request, even when it should not (CSRF) [note: SameSite attribute]

Embed in all URL links: token leaks via HTTP Referer header (or if user posts URL in a public blog)

In a hidden form field: does not work for long-lived sessions

Best answer: a combination of all of the above

Supported in most frameworks

PHP ex: output_add_rewrite_var(name, value)
The HTTP referer header

GET /wiki/John_Ousterhout HTTP/1.1
Host: en.wikipedia.org
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.google.com/search?q=john+ousterhout&ie=utf-8&oe=

Referer leaks URL session token to 3rd parties

Referer supression:
• not sent when HTTPS site refers to an HTTP site
• in HTML5:  <a rel="noreferrer" href=www.example.com>
The Logout Process

Web sites must provide a logout function:
- Functionality: let user to login as different user
- Security: prevent others from abusing account

What happens during logout:
1. Delete SessionToken from client
2. Mark session token as expired on server

Problem: many web sites do (1) but not (2)!!
⇒ Especially risky for sites who use HTTP after login
The Logout Process (cont.)

What if a user suspects their machine is compromised?

– Logging in from an untrusted machine (Internet Café), or
– Malware infection of user’s machine

Site must show all devices currently logged into user’s account

– Let user terminate any unrecognized device

⇒ mark terminated session token as expired on server
Session hijacking
Session hijacking

Attacker waits for user to login

then attacker steals user’s Session Token and “hijacks” session

⇒ attacker can issue arbitrary requests on behalf of user

Example: **FireSheep**

Firefox extension: hijacks HTTP session tokens over WiFi

Solution: always send session tokens over HTTPS!
Beware: Predictable tokens

Example 1: counter

⇒ user logs in, gets counter value,
  can view sessions of other users

Example 2: weak MAC. token = \{ userid, MAC_k(userid) \}
• Weak MAC exposes k from few cookies.

Apache Tomcat: generateSessionId()  
• Returns random session ID [server retrieves client state based on sess-id]
Session tokens must be unpredictable to attacker

To generate: use underlying framework (e.g. ASP, Tomcat, Rails)

Rails: \( \text{token} = \text{SHA256}(\text{current time, random nonce}) \)
Beware: Session token theft

**Example 1:** use of HTTP after login over HTTPS
- Enables cookie theft at WiFi access point (e.g. Firesheep)
- Other ways network attacker can steal token:
  - Site has mixed HTTPS/HTTP pages $\Rightarrow$ token sent over HTTP
  - Man-in-the-middle attacks on SSL

**Example 2:** Cross Site Scripting (XSS) exploits

Amplified by poor logout procedures:
- Logout must invalidate token on server
Mitigating SessionToken theft by binding SessionToken to client’s computer

A common idea: embed machine specific data in SID

**Client IP addr:** makes it harder to use token at another machine
  – But honest client may change IP addr during session
    • client will be logged out for no reason

**Client user agent:** weak defense against theft, but doesn’t hurt.

**TLS session id:** same problem as IP address  (and even worse)
Session fixation attacks

Suppose attacker can set the user’s session token:

- For URL tokens, trick user into clicking on URL
- For cookie tokens, set using XSS exploits

**Attack:** (say, using URL tokens)

1. Attacker gets anonymous session token for site.com
2. Sends URL to user with attacker’s session token
3. User clicks on URL and logs into site.com
   - this elevates attacker’s token to logged-in token
4. Attacker uses elevated token to hijack user’s session.
Session fixation: lesson

When elevating user from anonymous to logged-in:

**always issue a new session token**

(e.g. in PHP by calling `session_regenerate_id()` in PHP)

After login, token changes to value unknown to attacker

⇒ Attacker’s token is not elevated.
Summary

• Session tokens are split across multiple client state mechanisms:
  – Cookies, hidden form fields, URL parameters
  – Cookies by themselves are insecure (CSRF, cookie overwrite)
  – Session tokens must be unpredictable and resist theft by network attacker

• Ensure logout and timeout invalidates session on server